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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of software piracy on prominent and
non-prominent software developers in markets based on a two-sided
platform business. Consumer behavior is imperfect and, when adopt-
ing a platform, consumers only take prominent software into account.
We show that prominent software exhibits higher piracy rates than
non-prominent software. However, contrary to intuition, this does
not necessarily mean that prominent software developers benefit more
from increased software protection. Indeed, we show that prominent
developers may lose out whereas non-prominent developers may gain
from better software protection.
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1 Introduction
Many software products are centered around platforms. Examples for these
industries include game consoles, e-book readers, and applications for smart-
phones. In particular, applications for smartphones or tablet PCs have gained
much importance in recent years. Common to all these examples is that the
platform has to attract two sides. Consider the examples of game consoles.
There, a platform (i.e., the game console such as Microsoft’s Xbox 360, Nin-
tendo’s Wii, or Sony’s PlayStation) has to attract gamers (users who buy
the game console) and game developers. Users only find the game console
attractive if many games are available; at the same time, game developers
only find the platform attractive if they can reach many gamers. In this
aspect, these markets are characterized by two-sided network externalities
(see, e.g., Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Hagiu, 2006, 2009;
Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006).
Piracy of software seems to be a growing concern in these markets, poten-
tially leading to losses for both developers and platforms.1 Our study is in
particular motivated by the steadily growing market for software applica-
tions (so-called apps) which are popular among users of Internet-compatible
digital devices such as smartphones or tablets. In this market, operating sys-
tems (such as Android [Google], BlackBerry OS [BlackBerry], iOS [Apple],
Windows Phone [Microsoft]) act as platforms and software developers pro-
vide applications which run on the operating systems. As a matter of fact,
many sources point out that overall software piracy seems to be a major
issue in this market with some apps and/or games having piracy rates of
more than 90%.2 However, software developers seem to be affected differ-
ently by illegal downloads and software piracy. A recent study by the Yan-
kee Group and Skyhook investigating the impact of app piracy on 75 An-
droid developers revealed that 27% consider piracy a “huge problem” and
another 26% consider it “somewhat of a problem”.3 This means that slightly
less than half of the developers surveyed appear not very concerned by the
existence of piracy. In a survey of UK videogame developers, the trade in-
1See Rasch and Wenzel (2013) for examples and sources.
2See, e.g., http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/appsblog/2012/jul/23/dead-
trigger-android-free-piracy.
3See http://www.yankeegroup.com/about us/press releases/2011-09-08-1.html.
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dustry group TIGA found that only 10% of developers considered piracy a
threat to their business survival but 90% viewed it a “constant or increasing
problem”. However, 30% would not do business differently as a direct con-
sequence from the existence of piracy (with 50% saying they were in favor
of a change in business practices and 20% answering “don’t know”).4 This
raises the question why firms have such different views on piracy. In this
paper, we will provide a possible explanation, based on different promi-
nence levels, why some software firms within an industry may favor piracy
(or are affected to a lesser extent) whereas others may not.
We study the impact of piracy when software developers are differentiated
according to prominence. Prominent and non-prominent software differs
in two dimensions. Firstly, under a prominent piece of software we under-
stand a piece of software that is known by users well in advance of adopting
a platform and which is important for their adoption decision. Other pieces
of software are less well known and do not play a role in a user’s adoption
decision. Secondly, given that prominent software is better known, it is rea-
sonable that prominent software is more likely to be purchased by a user
than a non-prominent piece of software. We model this by assuming that
users derive a higher utility from prominent software.
The important assumption imposed in this model is that users are fully in-
formed about the availability of prominent software before adopting a plat-
form whereas users discover some other, non-prominent software only af-
ter they have adopted a software platform. Hence, at the adoption stage,
only prominent software is considered which means that the availability of
a prominent piece of software may have a large impact on market shares on
the user side.5 To the contrary, whether a non-prominent piece of software
is available or not does not influence users’ adoption decisions. However,
we think that this myopic user behavior is reasonable in many instances.
Let us discuss this main assumption and the motivation for using it in more
detail. Consider, for example, a situation where a user wants to buy a new
smartphone. Given the extremely large number of applications available
on the different operating systems, it is almost impossible for a customer
4See http://www.gamepolitics.com/2009/11/11/uk-dev-survey-piracy-problem-
not-threat#.USTcuq5STxo.
5In this aspect, our notion of prominence is closely related to ‘must-have’ components in
Hogendorn and Yuen (2009).
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to know all of them. Most likely, the customer will be only aware of major
applications (prominent software) but not of other, less prominent software.
Thus, at the adoption stage, only the prominent software matters.6 Over
time and after having gained some experience on the software platform,
the customer may discover software he was initially unaware of and which
he then eventually decides to purchase.
Within our framework we provide two main results. Firstly, given its larger
popularity, prominent software is more likely to be pirated by users. That is,
prominent software exhibits a higher piracy rate than non-prominent soft-
ware. However, contrary to basic intuition, this does not necessarily mean
that prominent developers benefit more from additional software protec-
tion, which is our second main results. Indeed, we show that piracy and
software protection may affect software developers quite differently depend-
ing on whether a developer is prominent or not. The reason lies in the plat-
forms’ pricing strategies toward these different types. Platforms have an in-
centive to subsidize prominent developers to attract more users. This effect
is not present (or only to a smaller extent) with non-prominent developers.
Thus, software protection has two effects for developers. Firstly, it increases
developers’ immediate revenues from software sales to users. This positive
effect of software protection applies to both types of developers. Secondly,
with stricter software protection, users value additional software less (as
software prices tend to be higher with more protection) inducing platforms
to compete less hard for developers. In other words, piracy induces plat-
forms to compete harder for developers. This leads to reduced license fees
for prominent developers. This second, negative effect of software protec-
6Note that one may argue that the most established applications are usually available
on the most popular operating systems Android and iOS and that, as a consequence, dif-
ferences in software may not matter that much for a consumer deciding between those two
platforms. However, this is not necessarily the case for other platforms with a lower user
base, such as BlackBerry OS or Windows Phone. Indeed, it has been pointed out that the
lack of a sufficiently large number of available applications has contributed to the low (de-
clining) market shares of those platforms. In that sense, the existence of established software
on a mobile platform appears an important aspect for users’ adoption decisions (see, e.g.,
http://www.crn.com/news/mobility/232301056/the-decline-of-blackberry-where-
rim-went-wrong.htm or http://www.cnet.com/news/blackberrys-loss-is-windows-
-phones-gain/). A comparison of the (non-)availability of the top 50 free and top 50
paid apps featured in the Apple App Store and Google Play in the United Stated on
BlackBerry World and Windows Phone store yielded a rate of only 34% as of May 21, 2013
(see http://www.canalys.com/newsroom/top-ios-and-android-apps-largely-absent-
windows-phone-and-blackberry-10).
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tion applies only to prominent developers. As a result, due to the first effect,
stricter software protection is positive for non-prominent firms. For promi-
nent developers, the second effect may outweigh the first one making them
possibly benefit from less software protection.
By now there is a growing literature on firm competition in the presence
of myopic user behavior.7 Related to our paper, models have been devel-
oped where consumer take only a subset of price components into account
when selecting a product (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Spiegler, 2006).8 This
literature is also concerned with the effects of a firm’s prominence by ei-
ther assuming that a prominent firm serves as the default option (Piccione
and Spiegler, 2009; Gu and Wenzel, 2014) or, in the context of search, by
assuming that a firm’s prominence affects a consumer’s search order (Arm-
strong et al., 2009; Armstrong and Zhou, 2011). We build on this litera-
ture by providing a model where consumers are myopic regarding their
platform adoption decision and take only prominent software into account
when choosing which platform to adopt. The main focus of this paper is
how this imperfect, myopic consumer behavior affects platform pricing and
the effects of piracy on prominent and non-prominent software developers.
The literature on piracy in platform markets is very limited.9 With the ex-
ception of Rasch and Wenzel (2013) who focus on the (mis)alignment of
platforms’ and developers’ software protection incentives, we are not aware
of further studies concerning this issue. However, given the increased im-
portance of software markets, which are organized as two-sided markets,
software piracy in these markets is getting more important. In contrast to
Rasch and Wenzel (2013), in this paper we consider imperfect consumer be-
havior and explore how heterogeneous software developers, which differ in
their prominence, are affected by software piracy. We show that it is impor-
tant to take this myopic consumer behavior into account since the different
types of software developers may be affected differently by piracy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the model setup. Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 discusses
two extensions of the base model. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
7A survey is provided by Huck and Zhou (2011) and a textbook by Spiegler (2011).
8See also Armstrong and Vickers (2012) for an application to financial products.
9For a survey on digital piracy, see Belleflamme and Peitz (2012).
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2 The model
This section introduces a model of piracy in a platform framework. The
model draws on the two-sided-market models of Armstrong (2006), Choi
(2010), and Belleflamme and Peitz (2010) as well as on the piracy model by
Rasch and Wenzel (2013).
Software platforms
There are two software platforms located at opposite ends of a unit line
where platform 1 is located at 0 and platform 2 is located at 1 (Hotelling,
1929). Platforms generate income from both users (by charging an access
fee of pi, i ∈ {1, 2}), prominent software developers (by a charging license
fee li), and non-prominent software developers (by a charging license fee
lˆi). All possible costs are normalized to zero.
Software developers
There is a unit mass of software developers which come in two types. A
fraction γ are prominent developers and a fraction 1−γ are non-prominent
developers. Prominent and non-prominent developers differ in two aspects:
(i) when adopting a platform, only prominent software is taken into account
by users and (ii) prominent software offers a higher (base) utility to users
than non-prominent software.
Software developers may multi-home and offer software products on both
platforms. Developing software is associated with an investment of f which
is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, independently for each type.
The profit of a prominent software developer that produces for platform i
amounts to
pi = φsi − li − f,
where si denotes the number of users at platform i and φ is the amount a
developer earns for each user reached on the platform. For now we take φ as
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given but we will provide a foundation below.10 In principle, the amount
a developer earns depends on its pricing strategy as well as on the level
of software protection. The license fee li and the investment cost f is sub-
tracted from revenues.
Analogously, the profit of a non-prominent software developer that pro-
duces for platform i amounts to
pˆi = φˆsi − lˆi − f.
Note that profits per user may differ for prominent and non-prominent soft-
ware. In addition, platforms may also set different license fees for promi-
nent and non-prominent developers.
Developers offer their product on a platform i as long as they do not incur
a loss, i.e., pi ≥ 0 ⇔ f < φsi − li =: f¯ and pˆi ≥ 0 ⇔ f < φˆsi − lˆi =: ˆ¯f . All
developers with f < f¯ and f < ˆ¯f enter.
Assuming that the platforms can price-discriminate between the two types
of software, the amount of prominent and non-prominent software on plat-
form i can then be expressed as
ni = γ(φsi − li) (1)
and
nˆi = (1− γ)(φˆsi − lˆi).
Software users
Users who only buy from one of the two platforms (i.e., they single-home)
are distributed uniformly along the unit interval. The location of a user is
denoted by x. When making the adoption decision, users are only aware
of the amount of prominent software. Thus, at the decision stage, the per-
ceived utility of a user who is located at x and who buys access to platform
10Note that, in principle, the amount a developer earns for each user may also depend on
the adopted platform. However, as platforms are identical (apart from the available soft-
ware), the value of a software product is identical across platforms and, hence, the earnings
per consumer does not depend directly on the platform. A similar reasoning applies to the
benefit a user receives from software consumption, which is introduced below.
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1 or platform 2, respectively, is given by
u1 = v + θn1 − p1 − τx
and
u2 = v + θn2 − p2 − τ(1− x).
Users derive an intrinsic utility of v from buying access to a platform.11 The
more prominent software ni is available on a platform the higher is a user’s
perceived utility. The benefit from an extra unit of prominent software is
given by θ. Below we will endogenize this parameter by modeling the in-
teraction between software firms and users in detail. Again, it will mainly
depend on the developers’ pricing strategy and on the extent of software
protection. Users incur linear transportation costs of τ per unit of distance
traveled.
Platforms’ market shares in the user market depend on user prices and the
amount of prominent software. The market share of platform i is deter-
mined by the user who is indifferent between buying from either of the two
platforms and is given according to the Hotelling formula:12
si =
1
2
+
θ(ni − nj)− pi + pj
2τ
. (2)
Piracy decision
We adopt a framework where legal and illegal software is vertically differ-
entiated (Yoon, 2002; Belleflamme, 2003; Bae and Choi, 2006). Suppose that
each software developer is a monopolist and that each user may buy one
unit of software from each software firm. This specification implies that
although users are not aware of non-prominent developers before the deci-
sion which platform to go to, they may buy their products later on. Users
differ in their valuation δ for the software. This valuation is uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1] (and independent of users’ platform preferences). A user
can choose between buying the software and copying it illegally. A user
11This stand-alone value may be due to pre-existing software or additional features the
platform offers (e.g., the possibility to watch DVDs or Blu-rays on game consoles).
12We assume that the market is covered, i.e., any user along the linear city buys access to
exactly one platform. This can be guaranteed by assuming v sufficiently large.
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may also decide not to use the product. Illegal copies provide a lower util-
ity than legally purchased software (e.g., due to a lack of manuals/technical
support or blocked access to an online community).
The utility of a user δ considering to buy a prominent piece of software is
V =

δ − ps purchase a legal copy,
(1− α)δ − k obtain an illegal copy,
0 otherwise,
(3)
where α ∈ (0, 1) measures the quality degradation of an illegal copy. There
is a (fixed) cost k associated with pirating a software product. This fixed
cost will be our measure of software protection. Better protected software
is harder to pirate, and hence, the lower is the threat of piracy. The price
charged by a prominent software developer is ps.
Users derive a lower utility from consuming a non-prominent software prod-
uct. This is captured by a parameter β ∈ (0, 1) that measures the discount
on the base utility of a non-prominent piece of software relative to a promi-
nent one:
Vˆ =

δβ − pˆs purchase a legal copy,
(1− α)δβ − k obtain an illegal copy,
0 otherwise,
where pˆs is the price charged by a non-prominent developer.
We assume that the costs of obtaining an illegal copy must not be too high:
Assumption 1.
k 6 α(1− α)β
1 + α
=: k¯.
This assumption ensures that in equilibrium some users indeed obtain an
illegal copy so that it is optimal for software developers to accommodate
piracy.13
13Setting the limit price that deters all users from obtaining the software illegally is only
profit-maximizing if the costs of piracy are higher than imposed under Assumption 1. For an
analysis of this case, see Yoon (2002) and Belleflamme (2003).
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Timing
In the first stage, platforms simultaneously set prices for users and license
fees for software developers. In the second stage, users and developers de-
cide which platform(s) to join. In the third stage, software developers set
the prices for their products and in the fourth stage, users decide whether
to buy software or copy it illegally.
3 Results
User piracy and the pricing of software
We start the analysis by studying users’ piracy decisions and the optimal
price setting by software firms. At this stage, platform adoption decisions
(by users and software developers) as well as platform prices are given.
We start with the consumption decision of a user regarding a prominent
piece of software. According to the utility function (equation (3)), the user
who is indifferent between buying the legal product and obtaining an illegal
copy is given by δ¯ := (ps − k)/α. The marginal user who is indifferent
between obtaining the pirated copy and not consuming is δ := k/(1 − α).
Hence, all users with δ > δ¯ purchase the product and all users with δ¯ > δ >
δ copy it illegally. Users with valuation lower than δ do not consume the
software.
For a given software price ps, the prominent software developer expects to
earn an income of ps(1 − (ps − k)/α) from selling the software to a user.
The optimal price is set at ps = (α + k)/2. Thus, from the interaction with
each user, a prominent software firm expects a revenue of φ(k) = (α +
k)2/4α.14 Note that φ strictly increases with the level of software protection.
This implies that, for given adoption decisions by users and developers, a
prominent firm benefits from stricter software protection.
Denote by δ¯∗ the marginal user who is indifferent between copying and pur-
chasing a legal copy given the optimal price. The expected surplus of a user
14We will write φ instead of φ(k) for simplification purposes in the following.
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for each prominent software product can be expressed as
θ =
∫ δ¯∗
δ∗
((1− α)δ − k)dδ +
∫ 1
δ¯∗
(
δ − α+ k
2
)
dδ.
Simplification yields θ(k) = (4−3α)/8−3k/4+(1+3α)k2/8α(1−α).15 Note
that θ decreases in the level of software protection k. Finally, we can also
derive the piracy rate of a prominent software product given the optimal
prices. This piracy rate amounts to δ¯∗ − δ∗ = 1/2− k(1 + α)/2α(1− α).
In a similar way, we can derive the optimal price set by developers of non-
prominent software. The only difference that arises is that the user utility
from consuming this type of software is discounted by a factor β. We ob-
tain the optimal price for non-prominent software as pˆs = (αβ + k)/2 and
revenue per user of φˆ = (αβ + k)2/4αβ. Non-prominent software exhibits
a piracy rate of ˆ¯δ
∗ − δˆ∗ = 1/2− k(1 + α)/2α(1− α)β.
Our first result compares the piracy rates of prominent and non-prominent
software:
Proposition 1. The piracy rate of prominent software is higher than of non-
prominent software.
The proposition shows that prominent software developers suffer to a greater
extent from piracy than non-prominent developers. The result also implies
that, for given adoption decisions, prominent developers would benefit to
a larger degree from increased software protection. However, in the follow-
ing analysis we will show that these preferences towards software protec-
tion may be reversed, in particular for prominent software developers, if
adoption decisions are taken into account.
Adoption decisions and platform behavior
We now analyze the adoption decisions and the price decisions by the plat-
forms.
15In what follows, we will write θ instead of θ(k) for simplification.
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The adoption decisions by users and prominent software developers are
interrelated and, hence, the demand for users and prominent developers at
a platform is interrelated. To take this into account, we solve equations (1)
and (2) simultaneously and express demand in terms of prices only, i.e.,
si =
1
2
+
γθ(lj − li)− pi + pj
2(τ − γθφ)
and
ni = γ
(
φ
(
1
2
+
γθ(lj − li)− pi + pj
2(τ − γθφ)
)
− li
)
.
User demand is independent of the amount of non-prominent software
available on a platform. However, the demand for non-prominent software
developers depends on the market share on the user side:
nˆi = (1− γ)
(
φˆsi − lˆi
)
.
Platform profits depend on three sources: access prices from users and li-
cense fees from both prominent as well as from non-prominent software
developers. Hence, profits of a platform i are given by
Πi = sipi + nili + nˆi lˆi.
In the symmetric equilibrium, platforms charge the following prices:16
p∗ = τ − 3γθφ+ γφ
2 + (1− γ)φˆ2
4
, (4)
l∗ = −θ − φ
4
,
and
lˆ∗ =
φˆ
4
.
Proposition 2. (i) Platforms may subsidize prominent developers, that is,
the license fee for prominent developers may be negative. (ii) The optimal
license fee for non-prominent developers is positive. (iii) User prices are
16We focus on market-sharing equilibria. This can be guaranteed by assuming that hori-
zontal differentiation among the platforms is sufficiently large.
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lower the more prominent software there is (higher γ).
Proof. Ad (i): follows as φ > 0 and θ > 0. The license fee is negative (pos-
itive) if θ > (<)φ. Ad (ii): follows from the fact that φˆ > 0. Ad (iii): by
differentiating expression (4) with respect to γ.
We see that introducing prominent and non-prominent software has two
effects on platforms’ pricing strategies. Firstly, platforms may subsidize
prominent software developers which has also been shown in Rasch and
Wenzel (2013). This can be optimal for a platform as users care about the
amount of prominent software such that it influence users’ adoption deci-
sions. This is not the case for non-prominent software so that it is optimal
to charge a strictly positive license fee toward these non-prominent devel-
opers. Secondly, platforms charge lower user prices the larger is the mass
of prominent software. This is because platforms earn less from prominent
than from non-prominent developers. Hence, the opportunity costs of at-
tracting an additional user are lower when γ is high. In turn, user prices are
lower with γ.
The following proposition evaluates the impact of software protection on
equilibrium license fees:
Proposition 3. (i) The license fees charged to prominent and non-prominent
software developers increase with the level of software protection. (ii) This
effect is stronger for prominent software developers.
Proof. Ad (i): ∂l∗/∂k > 0 as φ is increasing in k and θ is decreasing in k.
∂ˆl∗/∂k > 0 as φˆ is increasing in k. Ad (ii): it must be shown that ∂l∗/∂k >
∂ˆl∗/∂k. To this end, define kˇ := 3α(1−α)β/(2(1−α) +β(5α− 1)) and note
that kˇ > k¯. It holds that ∂l∗/∂k > ∂ˆl∗/∂k for all k < kˇ and hence, for all
k < k¯.
As the proposition highlights, license fees for both types of developers in-
crease with the level of software protection. This is also one finding in Rasch
and Wenzel (2013). However, what is new is that the license fee for promi-
nent developers increases to a larger extent due to a decreased subsidization
13
by the platform. There are two effects at work. Firstly, a higher level of soft-
ware protection increases developers’ immediate revenues from software
sales to users so that platforms can extract more rents from developers and
consequently increase the license fee. This effect applies to both types of de-
velopers. Secondly, with stricter software protection, users value additional
software less inducing platforms to compete less hard for developers which
induces platforms to increase license fees for prominent developers even
further. This second effect of software protection applies only to prominent
developers as only they are important for users’ adoption decisions.
Equilibrium platform profits amount to
Π∗ =
τ
2
− 3γθφ
8
− γ
(
θ2 + φ2
)
+ (1− γ)φˆ2
16
,
whereas the profits (net of developing costs) of prominent and non-prominent
software firms are given by
pi∗ =
θ + φ
4
, (5)
and
pˆi∗ =
φˆ
4
. (6)
We now evaluate the impact of software protection on firms’ profits. Let
k˜ := α(1− α)/(3 + α). Then, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4. (i) Prominent software firms are hurt by a higher level of
software protection if k < k˜ and benefit from a higher level of software pro-
tection if k > k˜. (ii) Non-prominent software firms benefit from a higher
level of software protection. (iii) Non-prominent developers benefit from a
higher level of software protection to a larger extent than prominent devel-
opers.
Proof. Ad (i): differentiating expression (5) with respect to k and solving
yields k˜. It follows that ∂pi∗/∂k ≷ 0 ⇔ k ≷ k˜. Ad (ii): differentiating
expression (6) with respect to k is always positive as ∂φˆ/∂k > 0. (iii) It
needs to be shown that ∂pˆi∗/∂k > ∂pi∗/∂k. Note that ∂pˆi∗/∂k > ∂pi∗/∂k ⇔
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∂φˆ/∂k − ∂φ/∂k > ∂θ/∂k. It holds that ∂φˆ/∂k > ∂φ/∂k and ∂θ/∂k < 0.
Hence, ∂pˆi∗/∂k > ∂pi∗/∂k.
The proposition shows that prominent and non-prominent software devel-
opers may be affected quite differently by piracy and software protection. A
higher level of software protection is favorable for non-prominent software
developers but may be to the detriment of prominent ones. In other words,
while prominent firms may appreciate more piracy, non-prominent firms
are indeed always hurt by piracy.
With more software protection, both types of software firms benefit from
an increase in legal sales to the same extent. The difference, however, stems
from the different pricing strategies by platforms toward these two groups.
With more software protection, platforms increase the license fee towards
both types of developers; however, the increase towards prominent devel-
opers is larger (see Proposition 3).
Now if users’ fixed cost of piracy—starting from a low level—increases, the
immediate positive effect with respect to sales revenues is outweighed by
the relatively higher license fees which leads to a decrease in profits for es-
tablished developers (Rasch and Wenzel, 2013). In this case, users rarely
purchase the legal version and hence developers make only low profits from
users. In order to nevertheless secure developers’ platform participation,
platforms compete hard to be attractive for users and therefore end up sub-
sidizing developers. As users start to purchase legal copies due to higher
costs for owning an illegal copy, the need for developer subsidization is
strongly reduced because at the same time, a larger number of developers
due to higher sales relaxes the competition on the user side. As a conse-
quence, platforms have a strong incentive to cut subsidies to developers.
Note that for high levels of software protection, there is less or no subsi-
dization which weakens the above effects.
As a result, for prominent software developers, the negative effect of an in-
crease in the license fee may not be compensated by the positive effect of
higher legal sales whereas for non-prominent software developers facing
lower increases in license fees, the increase in legal sales is always the dom-
inating effect.
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It is noteworthy that the effect of piracy is always relatively more positive
for prominent than for non-prominent software developers (see part (iii) of
Proposition 4). Even in the case where the overall effect of piracy is negative
for prominent developers (that is, prominent developers benefit from more
software protection), these developers are at least partially compensated by
lower license fees which is less the case for non-prominent software devel-
opers. Or put in other words, non-prominent software always benefit from
stricter software protection to a larger extent.
Existing studies have provided several explanations why developers of dig-
ital media products may actually benefit from piracy. For instance, it has
been shown that piracy may benefit developers in the presence of network
externalities (Conner and Rumelt, 1991; Shy and Thisse, 1999; Peitz, 2004),
complementary products (Gayer and Shy, 2006; Dewenter et al., 2012), sam-
pling (Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2006), or two-sided business models (Rasch
and Wenzel, 2013). This paper qualifies these results. The message is that
it is important to take developer heterogeneity into account as the effects of
piracy are likely to be heterogeneous across developers. Hence, this paper
provides an explanation why developers within an industry may have quite
different stands toward software protection and piracy.
As a final point we point out that, as in Rasch and Wenzel (2013), also the im-
pact of software protection on platform profits is ambiguous. There are two
counteracting forces. Competition for users may be intensified and compe-
tition for developers relaxed and either effect can dominate.
4 Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions to the baseline model. For tractabil-
ity, in these extensions, we focus on the case β = 1, so that the only differ-
ence between prominent and non-prominent software lies in the different
impact on users’ adoption decisions. With β = 1, this implies φˆ = φ and
θˆ = θ.
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4.1 Prominence
In the base model, we have assumed that there are two groups of software
developers: prominent and non-prominent developers. In this section, we
relax this assumption.
Suppose there are N groups of developers. Each group of developers h =
1, . . . , N is characterized by ωh which denotes the probability that software
from this group is taken into account by users when making the adoption
decision. Thus, ωh serves as an indicator for the prominence of a particular
piece of software. Without loss of generality, suppose ω1 > ω2 > . . . > ωN .
The fraction of developers in group h is γh ∈ (0, 1) with
∑
h γh = 1.17 We
still assume that platforms can set a different license fee to each group.18
With h groups of developers, a user’s perceived utility at the decision stage
is
u1 = v +
∑
h
ωhθhnh,1 − p1 − τx
and
u2 = v +
∑
h
ωhθhnh,2 − p2 − τ(1− x).
The profits of platform i read as
Πi = sipi +
∑
h
nh,ilh,i,
and the profit of developer of type h on platform i is
pih = φhsi − lh,i − f.
As in the base model investment costs are uniformly distributed on the unit
interval.
It can then be shown that the license fee group h is charged is given by
l∗h = −
ωhθ − φ
4
.
17The base model analyzed in Section 3 is the special case with two groups (N = 2) where
ω1 = 1, ω2 = 0, γ1 = γ, and γ2 = 1− γ. Moreover, β = 1.
18We will later explore the consequences of lifting this assumption.
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The license fee is the lower the more prominent a piece of software is, that is,
dlh/dωh < 0 as platforms are competing harder to attract those developers
that are important for users’ adoption decisions. The profit of a developer
of group h is:
pi∗h =
ωhθ + φ
4
. (7)
The following proposition evaluates the impact of software protection on
software developers’ profits. Let k˜(ωh) = α(1 − α)(3ωh − 2)/(2(1 − α) +
ωh(1 + 3α)).
Proposition 5. (i) A developer of type h is hurt by a higher level of software
protection if k < k˜(ωh) and benefits if k > k˜(ωh). (ii) The higher is the
level of prominence, the smaller is the parameter range where a developer
benefits from increased software protection.
Proof. Ad (i): differentiating expression (7) with respect to k and solving
yields the critical value k˜(ωh). Ad (ii): by differentiation, it follows that
∂k˜(ωh)/∂ωh > 0.
Proposition 5 demonstrates that the more prominent a firm is, the more
likely it is that this developer benefits from piracy and thus favors a low
level of software protection. All developers, independent of their degree
of prominence, benefit from an increase in legal sales if software protection
is high. However, developers are hurt by the increase in the license fees.
This effect is more pronounced for more prominent than for less prominent
firms. Hence, only for the most prominent firms, the increase in legal rev-
enues is consumed by the increase in the license fee. The effect of stricter
software protection becomes more and more negative the more prominent
a developer is.
4.2 Uniform license fee
In the base model, we have assumed that platforms can price-discriminate
between prominent and non-prominent software developers. This requires
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that platforms have a good knowledge of which software products are im-
portant for users’ adoption decisions. For many circumstances, this seems
to be a quite reasonable assumption. In other circumstances, however, the
distinction between prominent and non-prominent software products may
be less obvious and price discrimination may not be feasible. In particular,
price discrimination becomes less easy if there are many different groups
as in the preceding section. This section discusses the impact of piracy on
developers when platforms cannot set different license fees for prominent
and non-prominent software developers but are required to set a uniform
license fee to both types of developers.
It can be shown that the license fee for all developers is set at
l∗ = −γθ − φ
4
so that each developer earns profits of
pi∗ =
γθ + φ
4
. (8)
Let k˜(γ) := α(1−α)(3γ−2)/(2(1−α) +γ(1 + 3α)), we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 6. (i) Software developers are hurt by a higher level of software
protection if k < k˜(γ) and benefit if k > k˜(γ). (ii) The higher is the share
of prominent developers (γ), the smaller is the parameter range where a
developer benefits from increased software protection.
Proof. Ad (i): differentiating expression (8) with respect to k and solving
yields the critical value k˜(γ). Ad (ii): by differentiation, it follows that ∂k˜(γ)/∂γ >
0.
Proposition 6 shows that software developers can also be hurt by stricter
software protection if software platforms are not able to set different license
fees for prominent and non-prominent developers. In this case, also non-
prominent developers may benefit from a lower level of software protection.
They benefit from the presence of prominent developers and platforms’ in-
ability to price-discriminate.
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes piracy in software markets that are characterized by
two-sided network externalities. This issue is gaining in importance as an
increasing number of software markets are organized as two-sided business
models (e.g., smartphone applications, e-books), and piracy appears to be
a growing concern in those markets.
This paper argues that taking firm heterogeneity into account is an impor-
tant factor when evaluating the effects of software piracy in such markets.
In this paper, we develop a model with imperfect consumer behavior where
consumers only consider prominent software when choosing between com-
peting platforms. We find that even though prominent pieces of software
suffer from higher piracy rates, contrary to conventional wisdom, this does
not necessarily mean that higher software protection benefits those firms.
We show that relatively well-known products may indeed benefit from a
low level of software protection whereas less known software products are
hurt. The key to this result is that (i) there is tougher platform competition
for prominent than for non-prominent developers and (ii) competition for
prominent developers intensifies in the presence of low software protection
so that license fees are reduced heavily for prominent software developers.
This paper also raises issues for further research. In this paper, we propose
prominence as one potential reason why developers may have different at-
titudes towards piracy. On the theory side, future research could identify
alternative sources of heterogeneity that might also explain the different
stances towards piracy. On the empirical side, our paper invites research
that assesses the effects of piracy on different firm types or different indus-
tries. It would be valuable to evaluate which type of software firm bene-
fits/loses from piracy and how different firm characteristics affect those re-
sults since our model suggests that the effects might be heterogenous across
firms and/or industries.
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